

Cultural Competency and Incompetency in Depth Psychological Methods

**by
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Abstract

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by Albert Corrieri

Cultural competency is quickly becoming a core skill for psychotherapists.

Unfortunately, depth psychology does not have an extensive past or body of work that addresses diversity or cultural competency for practitioners to reference. Can Jungian trained clinicians and their methodology be considered culturally competent and viable when critically evaluated? This thesis reviews mainstream research on prejudice, stereotypes, and cultural competency alongside depth-oriented clinicians' attempts at addressing the subject. A hermeneutic methodology informed by deconstructive theories is used to explore the foundations of Jungian psychology and cultural competency theories to evaluate potential strengths and weaknesses. Many of Jung's concepts as well as the claims of his anti-Semitism and racism are investigated to evaluate the legitimacy of his theories and potential impact for clinicians currently utilizing them.

Table of Contents

Chapter I	Introduction.....	1
	Area of Interest	1
	Guiding Purpose.....	1
	Rationale: Context	2
	Methodology	3
	Ethical Concerns	4
	Advancing the Shadow	5
	Overview of Thesis	6
Chapter II	Literature Review.....	8
	Prejudice and Stereotypes	8
	Benevolent Prejudice	10
	Stereotypes	11
	Implicit Bias.....	14
	Psychodynamic/Jungian Theories.....	15
	Research on Counselor Prejudice	16
	Bias in Psychology.....	17
	Cultural Competency	20
	Multiculturalism and Post-Jungian Criticism	23
Chapter III	Findings and Clinical Applications.....	31
	Determining Diversity	31
	Contemporary Views on Prejudice	32
	Literalizing Diversity	34
	Frames of Reference	35
	Current Models of Diversity Training and What Is Missing	38
	Depth Psychology Limitations.....	40
	Appropriation and Essentialism	42
	In the Shadow of Jung.....	45
	Africans and Americans.....	47
	Current Clinical Conditions	50
Chapter IV	Summary and Conclusions	54
References	56

Chapter I Introduction

Area of Interest

This thesis is an exploration of the concepts of diversity and cultural competency in relation to depth psychology and critical theory. As an undergraduate studying cultural anthropology and social theory, I had a hard time accepting many of the dated theoretical paradigms still being utilized in Jungian circles. What I hoped to do in this paper is carry on the application of critical theory to classical Jungian psychology started by James Hillman, who established imaginal/archetypal psychology. Had I not been introduced to Hillman and later Andrew Samuels, the pioneer of post-Jungian studies, I would have most likely abandoned Jungian psychology. Many Jungians' resistance to move into poststructural paradigms and unwillingness to look at its founder's own shadow are disheartening to new practitioners who have been exposed to critical social theories. Samuels (2004) found this directive essential to the future of Jungian psychology when he stated,

The task for contemporary Jungian analysts and scholars is to engage openly in debates about such matters and to work out a firm ethical foundation for Jung's 'psychology of difference,' so that we shall no longer feel the need to throw the baby out with the bath water. (p. x)

Guiding Purpose

The goal of this work is to attempt to bring Jungian psychology closer to modern critical perspectives and open up a dialogue around the potential limitations of its founder Carl Jung. There are strengths and weaknesses in all psychological methods. This work

aims to bring out areas where Jungian methodologies and approaches may have been overlooked and can be applied to cultural competency and also to point out methodologies and theories that need to be retired. Professor of literary criticism George H. Jensen (2004) very eloquently described my thinking by stating:

Psychological theories need to be critiqued and reworked, explained in a new language, and dragged into a new age. Limitations of the theory, often a product of the culture in which the theory was constructed, need to be addressed. Latent potentials, maybe only marginally important to a previous age, need to be explored. (p. 20)

This thesis aims to follow this line of thinking and in the process revitalize Jungian psychology for modern practitioners.

Rationale: Context

With cultural competency and education on diversity becoming core components to the training and education of mental health workers, it is important for practitioners to self-evaluate and question their own individual fields of study. A look at some of the major associations that encompass psychotherapy show they have adopted some form of cultural competency and antidiscriminatory section in their code of ethics (American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists, 2012; American Counseling Association, 2014; American Psychological Association, 2017; National Career Development Association, 2015).

Even though concepts of diversity, multiculturalism, and cultural competency have permeated through academia and even into pop culture, there is still significant resistance when associations, programs, and individuals are challenged on their practices and approaches (Sue & Sue, 2016, p. 35). Many areas of depth psychology lack a critical exploration of the prejudice and bias that are inherent in its methodologies and theories.

This lack of introspection places Jungian-trained counselors at an even greater disadvantage because they have to contend with internal defenses as well as address their field's lack of critical awareness surrounding its outdated theories and its founder's biases.

Methodology

Due to the nonlinear framework in depth psychological traditions, there has been a patchwork attempt at theorizing diversity. Many theories simply inject a cultural layer to accommodate diversity or use more positivistic theories that do not integrate well into current depth psychological models. There are many aspects of Jung's thoughts that are relevant to modern practitioners, but there are also large parts of his theories that are stuck in modernity or laden with racism and anti-Semitism. The question this research addresses: can depth psychology and depth psychologists be considered culturally competent when their theories and methodologies are evaluated critically and placed within their historical context?

Various theories and methodologies were resourced from critical theory and poststructural paradigms. Critical theorist Michel Foucault's (1995) method of critical discourse analysis was used to review popular psychotherapeutic writings in their political and historical settings. As Foucault (1974) remarked:

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. (p. 6)

Critical pedagogist and activist Paulo Freire's (1970/2000) approach of critical consciousness was used as a method to dialogue with the material by questioning the

researcher and challenging the purported methods and concepts to arrive at new meanings. Freire stated, “The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world” (p. 73). A large part of this research was guided by Freire’s beliefs. Herein the concepts of diversity and cultural competency as well as the methodology and literature are deconstructed and analyzed. Thomas Teo (1999), professor of critical psychology discusses the importance of constructive deconstruction, which was my aim as well.

Some critical psychologists, myself included, began critical endeavors with *deconstructive* arguments, identifying eagerly the many weaknesses of mainstream psychology and its role in serving the interests of the powerful. With the acquisition of more critical knowledge, *reconstructive* studies that allowed for a more historically and theoretically sophisticated understanding of the problem became possible. And last but not least, I have tried to use construction. (p. 124)

Deconstructive theories informed a hermeneutic exploration to uncover the foundations that Jungian psychology and cultural competency theories are utilizing, so that the potential strengths and weaknesses can be evaluated. The dangers with utilizing poststructural and deconstructive paradigms are that they can result in the dismantling and invalidating of anything that is put under their lens. As Teo noted, the goal of construction should be kept in focus as a means to attempt to produce some form of provisional improvements to the current system.

Ethical Concerns

I want to state my affiliation with the larger discourse of white, heteronormative men writing on diversity, a discourse that is criticized in this paper. My goal was to avoid promoting definitive positions and fundamental truths and attempt to destabilize the current rigidity of belief through critical investigation. Ultimately, I hoped to use my

position and privilege to bring greater awareness to these issues and open up space for other dissenting voices to join the conversation. I am also aware that my research can be seen as pathologizing multicultural and diverse populations as units of treatment or as perceiving these populations as lacking agency and requiring special services. A primary goal of this paper was to bring awareness to the latent power dynamics and structures of oppression that may be present with Jungian psychologists so that they may expand their services to minority groups without continuing a legacy of oppression.

Advancing the Shadow

Jung first coined the term “shadow” to represent the unconscious traits opposite to what the ego identifies with (Samuels, Shorter, & Plaut, 2013, p. 138). If the ego is I, the shadow is the unconscious other. Typically, shadow traits are seen as the undesirable aspects of the psyche that are repressed due to their oppositional nature to the ego. Jung (1904/2014) described the shadow as the most readily accessible part of the psyche but inferred that it takes “considerable moral effort” (p. 8) to begin to work with. Jung also mentioned that the shadow content tends to express itself in projections, which can be a direct point of access (p. 9).

The concept of the shadow is advanced in this thesis in two different ways. First, it is used to refer to the unconscious prejudices and stereotypes that cultural competency attempts to address. Second, it is used to refer to the underbelly of many contemporary theories that attempt to address cultural competency and psychotherapy at large. Making the distinction between advancing and broadening the concept is important. Broadening a theoretical concept can, and often does, change the original author’s meaning, whereas advancing maintains the original meaning, but applies the concept to other areas. An

example of advancing is Samuels' (1993) work of applying the shadow to political ideologies. In this work, Samuels maintained the definition of shadow, as the unexamined and opposite aspects to a particular attribute, but then advanced the concept to working with political ideologies.

The ability to work with the shadow means that a clinician will work with the positive shadow as well as the negative. Staying true to the concept of the shadow, in an imaginal and personified sense, as Hillman (1977) discussed, requires one to look under the strength for its weakness as well as under the weakness for its strength.

Overview of Thesis

The following chapters dive into the study of prejudice, cultural competency, and Jungian methodology. Chapter II begins with a review of prejudice, stereotypes, and bias from early research to modern perspectives. Prejudice and stereotypes are explored as sociocultural and cognitive mechanisms that are employed across a wide range of human behaviors. The functional and dysfunctional aspects of stereotyping are explored as means of social cohesion and mechanisms of oppression. More recent concepts such as implicit bias and benevolent prejudice are reviewed to round out earlier theories that were missing these aspects. Material on counselor prejudice and the history of bias in psychology are examined to provide a foundation to review the current historical context of the field. Several major cultural competency methodologies are reviewed along with the contributions a few Jungian psychologists have made. Post-Jungian psychologists' works are examined and analyzed for writings that may contribute to cultural competency methodology.

Chapter III begins with an evaluation of the current cultural competency landscape. A modern perspective on prejudice and stereotypes is explored that combines early theory with modern additions and criticisms. Contemporary cultural competency theories are analyzed critically for what they may be lacking that could help contribute to ineffective treatment. Post-Jungian material is then brought into connection with cultural competency methodologies. Jungian theory is analyzed for bias and prejudice with the assistance of other post-Jungians who have addressed some of these concerns in the past. An in-depth review of Jung's potentially racist and anti-Semitic past is done by looking at some of the positions he held during the Second World War and his writings on African Americans. Chapter III is rounded out with a contemporary analysis of areas where depth psychologists can develop cultural competency utilizing their current skillsets. Chapter IV concludes the thesis and provides some areas for further study and research.

Chapter II Literature Review

Prejudice and Stereotypes

Within the frame of prejudice there are two common conceptualizations, neither of which is exclusionary. There are individual biases that are developed from personal experience and there are shared biases in the form of stereotypes. Like all scientific theories, approaches to prejudice have evolved over time. Research has shifted from a focus on prejudice as pathology or a personality disorder to a multifaceted approach where there is recognition of an interplay between core cognitive processing and societal and group influence (Choma & Hodson, 2008, p. 2).

Gordon Allport (1979), a key founder of the study of prejudice, wrote *The Nature of Prejudice*, which was an early and important source outlining the psychological and functional aspects of prejudice. Allport covered a wide breadth of information regarding the psychological and social development of prejudice along with an evaluation of policies that were attempting to address prejudice at the time he was writing. He defined prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (p. 9). He described the result of a prejudice as “plac[ing] the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own misconduct” (p. 9). Allport suggested that prejudice cannot hide behind moral relativism as prejudice has the direct goal of disadvantaging the group or individual (pp. 11-12). He

drew a clear line between the objective and direct nature of the effects of prejudice and the subjective nature of accommodating or ignoring discrimination.

Central to human cognition and “normal prejudgment” (Allport, 1979, p. 20) is the tendency for humans to cluster information. Allport (1979) detailed key aspects of human cognition that involve categorization. One primary aspect of human cognition that fuels prejudice is the tendency for humans to cluster and store experience to reference at a later time. According to Allport, this is a fundamental aspect of human functioning. He stated, “A new experience must be redacted into old categories. We cannot handle each event freshly in its own right” (p. 20). Allport discussed the process of cognitive learning that is essential to human survival. Humans encounter an event in life, either through direct experience or being taught, and they then store that information and place it into a specific category or “type” (p. 20). When looking at how categories turn into stereotypes, Allport believed that stereotypes function as cognitive shortcuts, as well as a way of regulating group interaction. He summarized the function of stereotypes as “act[ing] as both a justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in perception and thinking” (p. 192). A large part of his functional perspective on prejudice was the notion that prejudicial thinking helps to limit cognitive dissonance through the use of quick reference points to deal with new information.

Many of Allport’s theories have remained intact in current prejudice research, but later researchers have noted some limitations and oversights he made. *On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport* (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005) addressed many of the limited and conflicting views in Allport’s original work. One of the main

discrepancies was Allport's seemingly conflicting views between a predominantly cognitive-functional perspective and the roles that societal pressures play. In the years since Allport's publication, social psychologists have strengthened the position that societal and group norms play in the development and presentation of prejudice (Jackson, 2011). Initial cognitive models of prejudice, such as Allport's, assumed that there was an automatic retrieval of stored categories when an individual encountered a stimulus. These cognitive models assumed that stored prejudices would be retrieved and then applied in a uniform manner regardless of circumstance. When these theories were tested by social psychologists, they found that social context will directly affect which prejudices are accessed and utilized. Psychologists Bernd Wittenbrink, Charles Judd, and Bernadette Park (2001) tested participants' positive and negative associations when primed with contextual scenes of black actors. When shown the actors in a negatively associated context such as portraying gang violence, participants were more likely to associate negatively. When the participants were primed with a positive association at a family gathering, they reported more positive associations. Social researchers have also noted that social desirability responding affects the rates at which prejudice is expressed. This theory is reinforced by decreasing rates of self-reported prejudice thinking; however, the rate of discriminatory behavior has not decreased proportionately (Katz & Hoyt, 2014, p. 300).

Benevolent prejudice. As research in prejudice advanced, early theories were shown to have too limited a definition of prejudice. Research on benevolent prejudice gained traction in gender studies regarding paternal sexism and the effects of stereotyping women as having strengths that lead to them being seen as less capable than men

(Jackson, 2011). Theorists such as Allport (1979) focused too narrowly on the negative aspects of stereotyping, overlooking other ways prejudice is expressed. What was shown in later theories was that positive prejudice may be just as prevalent and powerful (Dovidio et al., 2005). Paternalistic and benevolent prejudice is defined as “a kind of subtle, ambivalent prejudice that involves feelings of sympathy that correspond to stereotypes that a group lacks capability” (Jackson, 2011, p. 25).

Stereotypes. When prejudiced beliefs are applied to an entire group they become a stereotype. Stereotypes create a simplified set of characteristics that are applied to all individuals in a targeted group. Social or ethnic stereotypes can be defined as “associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group” (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2013, p. 8). What can make stereotypes dangerous is that they allow a large amount of cognitive processing to happen in a short amount of time. On one hand, they generalize and heavily apply behavior to all group members, but, on the other hand, they essentialize the generalized behavior into individual typology. Researchers have emphasized the shared nature of stereotypes being a distinguishing characteristic from personal prejudice (Sechrist & Stangor, 2005, p. 171).

Research has also been done on the development of prejudice across age brackets, particularly in children. Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1936/1952) was a main figure in childhood cognitive development. He put forth the idea that “schema” (pp. 7-8) are essential to young children’s ability to organize reality. These schemata are representative categories that children build in order to process and organize their environment as it becomes increasingly more complex as they age. More recent research has found that the

core categories that children develop tend to absorb more social prejudices and stereotypes as they age (Jackson, 2011). Piaget believed these categories are mainly perceptually driven and largely removed from societal pressures. More contemporary research has shown that there is a developmental shift where egalitarian beliefs are prominent, regardless of larger group norms, and a point where prejudiced beliefs start to become pronounced (Sechrist & Stangor, 2005, pp. 179-180).

Coupled with formational categories taking on prejudice is the emergence of essentialist thinking. Many scholars studying prejudice have found that essentialist thinking is heavily tied to prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs. Susan Gelman (2007) studied the origins of essentialist thinking in children and found that early childhood development shows evidence of normative judgments in childhood thinking. Gelman described essentialist thinking as a “cognitive bias” used to simplify concepts into innate attributes that are unchanging (p. 7). Even though Gelman focused primarily on children, cognitive bias was also prominent when researchers investigated prejudicial thinking in adults. As psychologist Susan Fiske (1998) noted when addressing stereotype functions, “essentialistic explanations characteristically frame category membership as an unalterable, highly diagnostic, unifying theme, revealing a universally shared feature and excluding other memberships” (p. 370). Essentialist beliefs consist of attributing core traits that are seen as permanent, unchanging, and naturalistic to people.

An essentialist belief typically maintains that membership in a category is fixed or immutable and that one cannot readily shed or alter the identity that it bestows. It involves the imputation of an inherent nature, something underlying the surface characteristics of category members. It often involves a belief that the category is discrete, having a sharp boundary and all-or-nothing membership determined by defining (necessary and sufficient, i.e. essential) features. (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002, p. 86)

Other research has tied the beliefs of biological determinism and social determinism into essentialist thinking where biological traits and social background are seen as deterministic in a person's core character (Rangel & Keller, 2011).

Current trends in research conclude that the maintenance and production of social norms involving prejudice are not consistent and change depending on many different factors (Dovidio et al., 2013; Sechrist & Stangor, 2005). While prejudice and stereotyping are tied to cultural norms, an individual's psychology interprets these norms and then responds. This ambiguity in effect could be the reason there are so many different perspectives on approaching prejudice including the ones discussed in this paper. Researchers have taken a more comprehensive approach to combining an individual psychological approach while integrating the earlier group norm theories and maintaining a focus on group contact (Dovidio et al., 2013; Sechrist & Stangor, 2005). In these studies, prejudiced normative beliefs are evaluated based on their communication and flexibility to change. Recent research has found that prejudice and stereotypes are subtly influenced by how "appropriate" (Sechrist & Stangor, 2005, p. 179) certain discrimination is when compared to larger group norms. Researchers investigated whether stereotypes were inherently rigid and fixed and they found that rigidity and stability depend on context and that stereotypes are more fluid and fluctuate even within individuals (Garcia-Marques, Santos, & Mackie, 2006). When looking at the combination of influences on the development of stereotypes at an individual level, these researchers noted, "it is quite plausible to predict that the kind of stereotypic knowledge that is activated by the presence of a given gay person or gypsy should be quite different

depending on the context in which information was gathered” (Garcia-Marques et al., 2006, p. 825).

Stereotypes also help reduce the psychic distress of oppression by justifying inequities. Stereotypes function in a beneficial way to those who are ascribed the dominant group’s attributes. Professor of psychology Lynne Jackson (2011) mentioned how positive stereotypes attributed to minority groups, while they may seem beneficial, more often help justify their lower standing by attributing a characteristic that justifies their position (p. 13). Some researchers have tested these stereotype pairings and have shown that a noncompetitive group such as the elderly are viewed as simultaneously favorable, but incompetent (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). This same process is applied to gender, where women are viewed as compassionate, but not competitive.

Implicit bias. Implicit bias is the implicit communication of a stereotype or prejudice that is unconscious to the person communicating it but is being received by the object of the bias (Dovidio et al., 2013, p. 10). The implicit assessment test (IAT) is the most widely used assessment for measuring implicit bias in prejudice. IAT methods involve priming and association. The participants are shown a keyword and then are tasked with choosing an associated value. The test is thought to uncover underlying stereotypes based on the pairing the researchers find. As noted, “reaction times are typically faster for stereotypical prime-target pairings (such as black-poor, female-caring, and old-forgetful) than for nonstereotypical prime-target pairings (such as black-forgetful, female-poor, and old-caring). This is called the “stereotype priming effect” (Wheeler, 2012, p. 8). When reviewing results, the researchers drew their conclusions based on the number of pairings that match current prejudicial and biased stereotypes.

Although the IAT has been useful in showing underlying associations, researchers have noted inconsistencies with the outcomes when the data is reevaluated. Specifically, there has been criticism when the test's predictive validity is measured (Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). That the IAT is able to uncover unconscious associations seems apparent; however, there is doubt as to what inferences researchers can make on those pairings. Critics have recommended that outcome measures be adjusted based on the context of the application. This would include the social contexts of the researchers and individuals taking the assessment and adjusting the tool for social desirability effects (Blanton, Strauts, Tetlock, Jacard, & Mitchell, 2015). The argument for incorporating social context is that the IAT may just be measuring the construct validity, which is reflecting current cultural beliefs, but not necessarily the participants' own bias.

Psychodynamic/Jungian theories. As psychodynamic theories began to take hold in the early 20th Century, prejudice was seen as the result of underlying processes such as “projection, scapegoating, repressed frustrations and displaced hostility” (Dovidio et al., 2013, p. 32). The resulting treatment, Dovidio et al. (2013) stated, was assimilation back into society. Early researchers such as Allport (1979) focused on prejudice as a personality disorder that was seen as a microcosm of parental dominance. Psychologist Theodore Adorno's (1967) *The Authoritarian Personality* laid the foundation for the study of prejudice as a personality disorder primarily as a response to the atrocities committed during the Second World War. Adorno and his contemporaries attempted to locate the personality style that would lead someone to become prejudiced and turn to fascism. What more modern research has found is that Allport and these early

theorists overemphasized the role of specific personality traits, notably that prejudiced individuals were unstable, maladapted, and rigid (Dovidio et al., 2005, p. 14). Perhaps because of his unwillingness to fully embrace psychoanalysis, Allport (1979) made passing references to unconscious processes, but gave them limited emphasis in his book. Often when he did, he downplayed their role.

Research on counselor prejudice. Although there is an abundance of research on the origin and development of prejudices and stereotypes, many recent studies have focused on the effects these views or actions have (Dovidio et al., 2013, p. 10). This type of research has a large impact on psychotherapy and is written about frequently in regard to the therapeutic relationship. The research into implicit bias has shown there is a large amount of unconscious information exchanged between the holder of a bias and the receiver of the bias. This transmission of unconscious bias can severely influence therapeutic relationships. Psychotherapists and psychologists tend to self-report low levels of prejudice when asked; however, implicit tests have shown self-reporting is not a true indication of a lack of unconscious prejudicial processing (Boysen, 2009). Particularly salient when looking at counselor prejudice is that clients have been shown over time to adopt the therapist's values without that being a conscious goal of the therapist (Consoli, Kim, & Meyer, 2008). This implies that the longer a client is with a therapist, the more the therapist's values become internalized as the client's own.

Early research involving racial identity theory demonstrated that mixed-raced dyads were not effective on their own as a way to combat prejudice in session (Carter, 1998, p. 163). Racial identity theory assesses individual attitudes regarding the role race plays in one's personality and development. When therapist racial identity attitudes were

compatible with client attitudes, clients reported feeling more supported in session, and when therapist and client attitudes were incompatible, there was less cohesion in sessions (Carter, 1998, p 175). This research shows that the client's and therapist's perspectives on race and personality are equally as important as the race of the client and therapist.

Bias in Psychology

One of the earliest psychologists to address racism in the field was Robert V. Guthrie (2004) in his book *Even the Rat Was White*. In this book, Guthrie charted the development of bias in psychology at the hands of scientists and academics, particularly against black Africans in Europe and African Americans. He described the foundations of early psychology and anthropology as not merely marginally prejudiced, but stated that the techniques and theories in the fields were developed to prove the legitimacy of racist ideology (pp. 9-28). Through anthropometrics, anthropologists and psychologists were measuring people of color for underlying psychic and physiological differences based on physical appearances. Once biometrics reached a point where other fields such as anthropology were questioning the merits of its approach, psychology turned to psychometrics.

Early studies into minority populations were plagued with bias and racism. In personality studies, the popular mode of assessing internal capabilities in the early 20th century, minority populations were tested for characteristics that white scientists assumed they possessed. The introduction of statistics, g scores, and comparative psychological processes such as intelligence quotients set the stage for psychologists to justify their findings with statistics and percentages. Interestingly, Guthrie (2004) noted that even William Stern, who created the IQ formula, warned against it being used as a standalone

metric to evaluate an individual without the use of more comprehensive metrics outside of testing (p. 60). One of the more important topics Guthrie covered is the history of black psychologists, most of which is left out of modern psychological discourse. Guthrie traced the establishment of black colleges and early curriculum through to the beginning of psychological organizations such as the Association of Black Psychologists. Many changes that helped reverse decades of white bias and oppressive practices in psychology were addressed and counter-tested by these psychologists.

The recent emergence of critical psychology has also helped address many of the historical biases still present in modern psychological theories. Psychologist Robert T. Carter (1998) looked at the inherent values that contemporary psychology embodies and how these perspectives lack social and structural awareness. By focusing on intrapsychic processes and solutions, modern psychological theories tend to ignore the external factors surrounding racism. Interestingly, Carter mentioned how behaviorism and cognitive behavioral theorists see their treatments as bias free since they are dealing with simplified and specific units such as thoughts or behaviors. Behaviorists, according to Carter, may argue that behaviors and thought patterns are not racially biased and are easily corrected through workbooks or worksheets (p. 21).

In critical studies, Foucault's (2009) *History of Madness* is considered one of the primary texts for understanding the evolution of mental health treatments descending from the European traditions. Central to Foucault's work is that madness is a culturally constructed category to which dominant power groups have responded differently throughout time. Foucault emphasized the split from when madness was imbued with symbolic and religious motifs, to when Descartes's cogito emerged and madness was

secularized and became devoid of any merit. Eventually the mad were institutionalized with the poor for what he called the “moral condemnation of idleness” (Foucault, 2009, p. 62). Eventually madness and insanity were viewed as medical conditions and doctors presumed they could treat the madness and insanity as they would treat infection or cold. The rise of asylums and psychiatry created the psychoanalytic “gaze,” which allowed psychiatrists to exert authority over the domain of madness (Foucault, 2009, p. 488).

Foucault’s treatment of madness is foundational in its historicity; however, there were other authors within the field of psychology addressing similar issues at the time. In *The Myth of Mental Illness*, critical psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (1961) argued that psychiatry and the diagnosis of mental illnesses under the guise of medical treatment was a farce. According to Szasz, the mind, unlike the physical structures of the body including the brain, is noncorporeal and therefore does not fall within the domain of medicine and illness. Szasz stated, “since a mind is not a bodily organ, it cannot be diseased, except in a metaphorical sense—in the sense in which we also say that a joke is sick or the economy is sick” (p. 97). These words are still valid some fifty years later where biometrics still fail when attempting to assess most mental illnesses. Szasz was one of the more prolific writers in the field of antipsychiatry but differed in approach to Foucault. Where Foucault (2009) traced the development of knowledge and power to show how it was used to oppress, manipulate, and compartmentalize across all domains, Szasz tended to maintain that medical authority is valid when applied correctly.

More modern critics suggested that Szasz created a dualism between the mind and body that does not exist and that his personal philosophies of individualism and libertarianism pushed him to embrace a rigid perspective (Bracken & Thomas, 2010).

Critical psychology has taken pieces of Foucault's treatment, along with the dialogue and criticisms opened by the antipsychiatry movement, in an attempt to reconcile difficulties in working with the mind. As psychiatrists Patrick Bracken and Phillip Thomas (2010) stated, "the aim [of critical psychology] is not to replace one psychiatric authority with another but to weaken the notion of authority in the field of mental health altogether" (p. 227). The application of critical theory to psychology has resulted in several different applications. Teo (1999) described how methodology can fall into four primary modes: "critical theoretical psychology . . . critical theoretical psychology with a practical emancipatory intention . . . critical empirical psychology . . . and critical applied psychology" (p. 119). These orientations are not exclusionary and usually contain aspects of each other or rely on research others have done in those respective domains.

Cultural Competency

Multicultural competencies have not always been a focus of psychologists. In the 1950s psychologists started to address the inherent biases in psychology, but it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that psychologists began actively pursuing alternative therapies for minority populations (Robinson & Morris, 2000, pp. 241-242). These pioneering psychologists helped in the creation of multicultural competencies guidelines that have been adopted by all of the major professional organizations to this day. There is no shortage of material on cultural competency methodology, so I have limited my examination to what was used in my education and several other popularly used publications.

Two of the more outspoken and influential theorists in the field of cultural competency are psychologists David Sue and Derald Sue. Their major publication

Counseling the Culturally Diverse (2016) is now in its seventh edition and is widely referenced as a source for cultural competency methodology. Sue and Sue covered a broad spectrum of cultural competency. Their foundation to cultural competency relies on the importance of counselor awareness and exploring how cognitive, emotional, and behavioral resistances serve to reinforce prejudiced behavior (Sue & Sue, 2016, pp. 34-43). The topic of one's own cultural awareness comes up very often in their work and is commonly cited as a reason for ruptures in the therapeutic process. They considered multicultural competence as the "superordinate" (p. 59) form of competence that clinicians can obtain. Their argument is that clinicians cannot even begin to consider themselves competent because their methodologies cater to "White Eurocentric norms that exclude most of the world's population" (Sue & Sue, 2016, p. 59). The importance here, is that competency must be based on a skill set that is not limited to White European cultures. They emphasized counseling styles that mesh with the client's larger cultural framework in which a counselor should always be determining when to use universal interventions or culturally specific ones. One important concept they presented is cultural humility. They described cultural humility as an "other orientation" (p. 73) in which the ego of the clinician is held back, and the cultural experience of the client takes the forefront. Cultural humility is presented as a mindset that all counselors should operate within to try to withhold as much ethnocentrism, elitism, and bias as possible towards the goal of cultural cognitive empathy.

The use of acronyms to create an easily accessible set of criteria for counselors to use is a common means to integrate cultural competency into practice. Psychologist Pamela Hays' (2008) ADDRESSING model (which stands for "Age, Developmental

disabilities, Disabilities obtained later in life, Religion and spiritual orientation, Ethnic and racial identity, Socioeconomic status, Sexual orientation, Indigenous heritage, National origin and Gender” [p.18]) is one of the more comprehensive and widely used frameworks. Like Sue and Sue (2016), Hays (2008) asserted the importance of counselors self-evaluating their own personal biases and educate themselves on the larger prejudices and stereotypes affecting minority populations. These biases, according to researchers such as Hays, influence the therapist’s ability to be responsive to the client’s cultural heritage. Importantly, Hays instructed therapists to learn the cultural history of their clients’ ethnicity outside of the session. She used the example of a Canadian-Haitian client’s multiple identities stretching back to Haitian independence and the autocratic rulers that created waves of refugees (p. 79). In this scenario, the onus is on the therapists to research and educate themselves about cultural history outside of the therapy session to attempt to avoid probing questions and mitigate as many gaps as possible between the clients’ and therapists’ identities. Hays also attempted to integrate a “culturally responsive” (p. 105) model to clinical assessment when diagnosing clients. This assessment style utilizes her ADDRESSING model along with the therapist’s ability to understand the client’s heritage when asking standardized questions. Hays indicated that therapists should learn as many different modalities as possible, including indigenous and local healing traditions, so that therapists can utilize aspects of each modality to create a culturally appropriate model for treatment.

For competency involving families, *Ethnicity and Family Therapy* (McGoldrick, Giordano, & García-Petro, 2005) covered a wide number of cultures in one publication. The volume is broken into nine sections separating cultural groups. The chapters begin

with a brief cultural history of the group and explain some common normative values that are present in that culture. Explanations on how each ethnic group's values might present in therapy are discussed, as are strategies for working with each population. The book targets counselors working within the United States and, as such, heavily focuses on acculturation issues as a primary reason the families are in therapy.

In addition to focusing on self-assessment and learning cultural heritage, many researchers advocate for therapists to gain direct experience working with minority populations that may not come into their practice. For graduate students, it has been shown that experiential coursework in which students are working within the community has substantial outcome measures for self-reported and supervisory reported competency measures (Burnett, Hamel, & Long, 2004). With social justice initiatives on the rise, many scholars are pushing for more client advocacy and direct action as goals for the therapist. Departing from earlier methodologies in which multicultural awareness, knowledge, and skill were considered enough, current approaches are pushing for “systemic” and “legislative” levels of client advocacy in order for therapists to be truly culturally competent (Nassar-McMillan, 2014, p. 113).

Multiculturalism and Post-Jungian Criticism

Hillman (1977) developed imaginal/archetypal psychology in response to his encounters with traditional Jungian psychologists. As a Jungian-trained analyst himself, he found many of the applications of Jung's original concepts stale and too rigid to be effective. He addressed many of these issues as well as presenting his own approach, archetypal psychology, in *Re-Visioning Psychology* (1977). Hillman was a vocal critic of the state of Jungian psychology and critiqued Jungians' lack of imagination and rigidity

in thinking. He compared Jungians to the Freudians of the time, stating, “If long things are penises for Freudians, dark things are shadows for Jungians” (Hillman, 1990, p. 24). To Hillman, Jungians did not understand Jung’s underlying message and were guilty of codifying inaccurate representations into methodology.

Samuels (2014) first coined the term “post-Jungian” in *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, in which he evaluated the state of Jungian analytical practice and theory after Jung’s death. To Samuels, post-Jungian meant “both a connection to and a critical distance from Jungian thought and practice” (2004, p. vii). Samuels has been one of the most vocal advocates for a critical examination of Jungian concepts. He has long called for a revisiting of the antiquated and prejudiced theories of Jung to remove them from the theories that are valuable in contemporary psychotherapy (Samuels, 1993, 2014, 2016). He has also accused the Jungian community of splintering into “fundamentalist” (2008, p. 12) camps where each camp is on the extreme end of their spectrum and disregards the valuable approaches in each other. Samuels (1993, 2015) was consistent in advocating for a more political form of therapy. He believed that we are political beings and that politics inform the ways that both the therapist and client think or act, which should be utilized not avoided in the therapy session.

Jensen (2004) attempted to assess Jung’s concepts in light of the past decades of postmodern and poststructural theories. He summarized many of the criticisms that scholars addressed when studying the various aspects of Jung’s theories or life.

[Jung’s] focus on sexuality is often considered reductive, aspects of his work are sexist. He was the cognitivist who studied memory, the structuralist who wrote about transcultural archetypes or developed a taxonomy of types, the liberal humanist who studied alchemy, the Kantian phenomenologist who studied categories of mind, or the modernist who attempted to establish the mind as a foundation for knowledge. (p. 2)

Jensen also added that Jung had another side that was more fluid in his thinking, one that was skeptical of positivism, embraced nontraditional gender, and developed a dynamic theory of the mind (p. 3). This reflexive version of Jung is the one that most Jungian scholars reference when citing his theories or personality.

Jungian psychologist Polly Young-Eisendrath (1987) identified the lack of critical theory and inherent whiteness in the Jungian community over thirty years ago. She traced this back to Jung's own beliefs regarding black Americans and black Africans. She proposed that the absence of black analysts was a result of a psychological splitting where white analysts perceive people of color as parts of their personality they hate (p. 43). Young-Eisendrath argued that Jungians will be stuck in an antiquated and racist ideology until they begin to address the inherent biases in Jungian thought and try to include more minorities in the Jungian community.

Criticisms of Jung and his psychological theories have also come from outside of the Jungian community. Clinical psychologist Richard Noll wrote two books, *The Aryan Christ* (1997) and *The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement* (1994) that questioned Jung's motivations. In *The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement*, Noll argued that the split between Jung and Freud was primarily due to Jung's abandonment of critical methods in pursuit of a religious and spiritual occultism. He claimed Jung's concepts of the collective unconscious and the pursuit of individuation were the result of Jung branching off from his scientific background and into mysticism. In his follow-up, *The Aryan Christ*, Noll (1997) went on to argue that after Jung dove deeper into mysticism, Jung started to see himself as a modern prophet. Much of the book traced Jung's personal life and relationships and accused him of attempting to build his

psychology as a religion to fuel his self-aggrandized ego. Prominent Jungian scholar Sonu Shamdasani (1998) refuted many of these claims in his rebuttal work, *Cult Fictions: C. G. Jung and the Founding of Analytical Psychology*. Shamdasani's approach to refuting these claims was to revisit Jung's contributions to the field of psychology. Shamdasani argued that Noll misconstrued Jung's interest in religion and occultism in an attempt to grab headlines and attention at a time when investigations into cults were popular (p. 8).

Many of the authors who have advocated for integrating postmodern theory and embraced the post-Jungian approach have also addressed the racism and prejudice in Jung's past. One of the earliest works done by notable Jungians was *Lingering Shadows: Jungians, Freudians and Anti-Semitism* (Maidenbaum & Martin, 1991). These papers were the result of two conferences the C. G. Jung Foundation held in 1989. The edited volume contains individual chapters that examine the history of Jung and Freud in light of criticisms that Jung was a Nazi sympathizer and anti-Semite. Among the many notable occurrences of Jung's questionable rhetoric were the articles published during his time as the editor of the *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie* and his remarks on Jewish culture and psychology during the Nazi regime (Samuels, 1991). Prominent Jungian author Jay Sherry (1991) approached Jung's comments on Jewish psychology as a way to address his feelings towards Freud and Freudian psychology after his and Freud's falling out. Sherry proposed that Jung's decision to post his remarks on Jewish culture were an attempt to get back at Freud for the split between them and were a product of Jung's resentment towards Freud's dismissal of his views (p. 123). Jung (1930/1970) also has a marked past in addressing people of color. When he reminisced on his trip to the United

States and experiences with African Americans, he was alarmingly racist in his characterizations of them. Psychologist Farhad Dalal (1988) addressed Jung's racist associations and claimed that most of his theories rely on racist comparisons. Dalal asserted that Jung's concept of the collective unconscious and individuation are based on biological determinants that favor white European populations (p. 271). Dalal was able to connect social Darwinism and racial development psychology to Jung's hierarchy of psychic layers through Jung's own association of black skin to primitive mental development. Because the Jungian theory of the mind has developmental layers, it is easy to see that Jung would have considered those he saw as primitive only inhabiting the lower, less refined levels of the psyche.

Multicultural perspectives from a depth psychological approach are limited but have been attempted. One of the more comprehensive volumes by Jungian psychologist Michael Vannoy Adams (1996) is *The multicultural Imagination: "Race," Color and the Unconscious*. Adams proposed that the general lack of psychoanalytic research on racism was due to the field's early obsession with sexuality (p. xx). He addressed multiculturalism in wide swaths in an attempt to cover many different aspects relating to prejudice and the unconscious. The concept of a cultural unconscious is expanded upon by Adams to include aspects of the collective unconscious and cultural factors such as stereotypes and prejudice. Adams introduced common cultural motifs, which are evaluated for underlying cultural and psychological phenomena. Adams applied imaginal and archetypal approaches from both Hillman and Jung to look at unconscious processing and projection, and how those concepts can be used to develop multicultural thinking. Adams saw the primary issue in the United States as the oppositional dynamic between

black and white groups. Using an archetypal approach to how images are embodied in racial tensions, he explored different symbolic representations and cultural values tied to devaluing archetypally black/dark concepts and overvaluing archetypally white/light concepts. Using Hillman's (1986) article on white supremacy, Adams expanded on the archetypal patterns of these commonly contrasted groupings and called for depth psychologists to be less reductive in their use of images. Hillman's proposition is that the largest contributing factor to having white and black categories remain diametrically opposed is that the "fantasy of supremacy" (p. 29) is based on opposition instead of difference. According to Hillman, the elitism of whiteness relies on the absolute rejection of darkness and a view that whiteness is not different, but opposite, from darkness. He stated, "Differences neither compete, contradict nor oppose. To be as different as night and day does not require an opposition of night and day" (p. 39). In this regard, both Adams and Hillman align in their emphasis on resisting a rigid, literal, and superficial examination of images and encourage an openness to more pluralistic and less dualistic thinking.

Utilizing Jung's theory of complexes, Jungian psychologists Thomas Singer and Samuel Kimbles (2004) developed the idea of a cultural complex. Cultural complex theory proposes that a shared complex emerges when groups experience repeated historical trauma. Singer and Kimbles explained that cultural complexes are apparent when overtly emotional and unhealthy practices are being exercised through shared cultural practices (pp. 6-7). The complex exists in the cultural unconscious, which Adams (1996) elaborated on, but also within the personal unconscious of the individual. The authors explained that by attempting to understand the cultural complexes that exist

within a group, a therapist will be better informed to know what personal or cultural complexes are being expressed in the therapy session.

Psychologist Helen Morgan (2010) framed some of critical psychologist Frantz Fanon's (1961/2011) ideas in relation to a cultural complex. Morgan examined the experience she had with a black client as a white therapist, and how white supremacist ideas of blackness and whiteness are imbued in the psyche as a cultural complex. Morgan relied heavily on Fanon's concept of how oppressors' beliefs enslave not only the psyche of the oppressed, but also that of the oppressor. She discussed how the effects of "whitewashing," the idea of white supremacy, "brainwash" the belief in dominant cultural ideology, and the oppressive effects of white supremacy influence the way black and white populations view themselves and others (p. 217). This work built upon her previous writing regarding the projection of white racist shadow material onto any population or group seen as different (Morgan, 2003). Through the model of shadow projection, Morgan viewed racism as a way for white populations to "dehumanize and depersonalize" rather than accept otherness (p. 252).

More recently, Jungian author and analyst Fanny Brewster (2017) wrote *African Americans and Jungian Psychology: Leaving the Shadows*. Brewster addressed the historical biases present in Jungian psychology while also attempting to advance a methodology to utilize new approaches in working with African Americans. She began by explaining that a dialogue needs to begin around the "racial complexes" (p. 24) present in the United States. She announced a call to arms for the Jungian community to begin addressing the way these complexes are operating within the field of Jungian psychology and in the larger U.S. population. As an African American practitioner

working with other African Americans, Brewster offered case studies in which she utilized an archetypal approach to approaching latent trauma in black populations. Her approach to cultural competency involves a combination of African healing modalities, archetypal psychology, and critical consciousness to address the ever-present and ongoing effects of historical trauma. Much like Adams (1996) and Morgan (2003, 2010), Brewster (2017) took issue with the way that Jungian literature portrays images of darker skinned people as primitive, less developed, or representations of rejected and suppressed parts of the psyche. She advised against using these types of associations and showed how they inhibit Jungian psychology from being able to help heal the effects of racism and oppression in the United States.

Finding dedicated works addressing Jungian multicultural practice is rare, but there are authors who are pushing for this material to take prominence. Many of these writers have acknowledged the limited scope of their contributions but demonstrated eagerness to address the racist past of Jung and are hopeful that future Jungians will continue to contribute to the development of Jungian multiculturalism.

Chapter III

Findings and Clinical Applications

Determining Diversity

Diversity is a concept that is difficult to define. Although many have attempted to describe diversity, and have promoted their methods to approaching diversity, it remains a complicated and obscure topic. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defined diversity as “the condition or quality of being diverse, different, or varied; difference, unlikeness” (“Diversity,” 2015). This definition emphasizes distinction and differentiation as an integral part of the concept. Diversity becomes the other to the established principle.

One aspect that makes a clear definition of diversity difficult is that diversity conceptually represents a polymorphic paradigm. Without qualifying and clearly structuring the type of diversity one is talking about or researching, the concept becomes too vast and fluid to be manageable. Conversely, having to delineate and codify diversity limits the scope and utility of the concept. Psychologists Miguel Unzueta, Eric Knowles, and Geoffrey Ho (2012) and Unzueta and Kevin Binning (2011) described how certain psychological features react to an external cue which then restructures our definition of diversity. These studies show that ambiguous concepts such as diversity do not inherently have a preexisting definition that is universal, but rather the definitions change depending on the individuals using them and the contexts they are applying them to. What is defined as diversity becomes a fluid concept that can be mapped to whatever concept or environment one chooses.

Contemporary Views on Prejudice

Prejudice is a cognitive phenomenon that is seemingly ubiquitous. Many would argue that it is a delusion to think we cannot be prejudiced. German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) stated:

A person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying on the objectivity of his procedures and denying that he himself is conditioned by historical circumstances, experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate him. . . . A person who does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what manifests itself by their light. (p. 360)

What is lacking in early discussions of prejudice is the reflexivity and criticism of the later poststructuralists who doubted the objective empiricism of science. Allport's (1979) research, while incredibly valuable and influential in setting the tone for research on prejudice, held the belief that there is a way to discriminate between legitimate prejudice based on scientific facts, which would be a rational judgment, and prejudice that is based on "scant" data that is "overcategorized" (p. 11). Although understandings of prejudice, particularly in academia and cultural competency trainings, focus on negative stereotypes, prejudice can also take the form of positive attributions. Allport discussed this type of prejudice briefly, but instead focused on the functional aspect to "love-prejudice" (p. 28) in promoting in-group cohesion. As researchers have noted, benevolent prejudice and paternalistic stereotypes do not take the form of a traditional discriminatory prejudice, but serve the same function to disadvantage and marginalize (Jackson, 2011). The lack of awareness in early research and some contemporary research on benevolent prejudice can lead to large gaps in identifying prejudicial behavior.

Clinicians have to examine and unpack the positive prejudices they hold alongside their negative prejudices. Both types of prejudice are generalizations and can obscure the reality of the client sitting in the room. These positive stereotypes can be as, if not more, damaging to groups as negative ones. Several salient positive stereotypes that are present in popular culture are that African Americans are better at athletics than other ethnicities or that Asian Americans excel at math and engineering over others. While these stereotypes may seem strength-based and positive, they work to maintain the minority status of these groups in the larger dominant white culture, which they are being compared against. The other aspect of benevolent prejudice is that it often becomes embodied by the targeted groups whereby they may embrace the characteristics and fall victim to the mechanisms of oppression built into the stereotype (Eagly & Diekmann, 2005, p. 11).

Stereotypes and prejudice are important to the maintenance of an individual's sense of normalcy and reality (Allport, 1979). Allport (1979) discussed the tendency of the mind to group as much information into one workable category as possible. He attributed this tendency less to a model of efficiency and more to the comfort humans find in simplicity. The less discriminating the mind is, the less cognitive dissonance it should encounter. "Recognizing that one has been influenced by privilege has been shown to cause some psychological distress" (Jackson, 2011, p. 23). This process also lends itself to ethnic prejudice, Allport noted, as one does not have to learn the idiosyncrasies of other ethnicities if they can all be put into a convenient category.

Working in conjunction with the mind's tendency to store experiential information to access later, two other psychological aspects also support prejudicial

thinking. These are the mind's tendency to color categories with a value or feeling and the bifurcation of categories into rational or irrational (Allport, 1979, pp. 21-23). These two characteristics work in tandem as many categories that are irrational are usually reinforced by an emotional belief that acts as a rational counterweight (Allport, 1979, p. 22). It is very important for clinicians to be aware of the various ways that prejudice operates and the ways that humans will bend and distort their beliefs and perspectives to maintain stereotypes and prejudice beliefs.

Literalizing Diversity

Since the discourse in current mental health is reliant on empirical medical models, new concepts are unconsciously grouped into the current paradigm. Diversity gets labeled as a symptom to be addressed in session that can be worked on objectively through interventions or a workbook. Evidence-based practices and treatment manuals are put forth as a means to literalize all of our experiences as clinicians; by pathologizing diversity clinicians attempt to concretize and literalize and therefore destroy it.

An emphasis on the literalized version of diversity creates a reliance on a reason-focused and conscious-bound engagement with the concept; however, implicit bias is unconscious and difficult, if not impossible, to explore through individual rational exploration. Foucault (1984) warned of the dangers of reason and the belief that it can reach universal truths (p. 13). Within Foucault's perspective, each scientific age has its specific version of what reason is. Once this reason is established then science, in its pursuit of truths, will replace the previous reason with a new, more accurately truthful version of reality. Reason, as Foucault stated, "is senseless to refer to . . . as the contrary entry to nonreason" (p. 14).

Given that the field of cultural competency is so vast and also heavily tied to academic politics, authors have to put forth their own approach in an attempt to carve out a unique space for recognition. There is also the issue of specialization and lack of multidisciplinary research. Many of the cultural competency manuals, handbooks, and resources aimed at mental health practitioners are written by mental health practitioners. Authors such as Sue and Sue (2016), Hays (2008), and McGoldrick et al. (2005) are all writing from a specific viewpoint within the frame of clinical psychology. Although a lack of a multidisciplinary approach is not relegated to the mental health field alone, this problem becomes more pronounced in fields where theory meets praxis. Pathologizing diversity can also lead to the belief that a cultural competency deficit can be filled, leading clinicians to attempt to master cultural competency or to fall under the illusion that they are competent because of reading a few books or taking a few continuing education credits. What would be worse is that it might also be seen as something that is unnavigable and breed feelings of hopelessness, carelessness, and apathy.

Frames of Reference

Many social researchers have preferred to address theoretical perspectives as frames of reference. The concept of frames was primarily developed and advanced by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1974). Goffman defined frames as “principles of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them” (p. 10). The frame one uses contains and constrains the available experience of the individual. When psychotherapists are using a particular modality or are heavily invested in a singular theory, they are operating within a particular frame of reference. Most graduate programs will favor one theoretical orientation over others. When psychotherapists choose a main

orientation, they then inhabit that frame. Given that many therapists value contemporary Western ideals regarding equanimity in relationships and self-independence (Consoli et al., 2008, p. 188), understanding what values your orientation promotes and the historical biases it holds is a crucial stage in beginning to develop cultural competency.

Each theoretical frame constrains the psychotherapist's view through their theories of personality and through the ideas about how change is enacted in therapy. For example, psychodynamic and psychoanalytic therapists tend to focus on unconscious patterns and the effect of transference and countertransference (Hepburn, 2003, p. 71). Within the object-relations field, unconscious material will be projected or introjected (Hepburn, 2003, p. 73). Cognitive behavioral therapists value the ability of logic in changing thought patterns and behavior in therapy (Beck & Weishaar, 2014). Person-centered and humanistic therapists see the goal of therapy as helping the client self-actualize through mirroring positive regard (Rogers, 1980). These theories each have their own frames through which they view the client's and the therapist's roles, as well as a belief in what is being communicated. Although inhabiting a frame can be beneficial in guiding and assisting a therapist, it can also be a confining space where peripheral information is disregarded or ignored. Certain weaknesses arise when one attempts to integrate a critical approach and shadow material to these theories. For instance, Rogerian approaches believe in unconditional positive regard, but ignore the microcosm of sexism, racism, and prejudice present in both the therapist and client at all times. Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches may recognize that racism will present itself in the therapy room through transference and countertransference, but the emphasis is on

controlling and navigating through these processes rather than exploring them with the client directly.

A basic tenet to most psychotherapeutic work, regardless of modality, is that the client will internalize certain attributes from the therapist. Mostly this is believed to be done through mirroring and reflecting back comments the client makes, but it is also believed to be an unconscious process as well. There is the notion that a client will internalize positive regard shown to them or become confident when sitting in uncomfortable emotional realms while the therapist is modeling effective regulation. Although there is great merit to these notions, and they are found to be effective, the notion that the client is also internalizing the therapist's prejudices and stereotypes is rarely if ever configured into those scenarios. Psychological researchers Andres Consoli, Bryan Kim, and Dinorah Meyer (2008) showed that therapists' values, not just abilities, are transmitted and internalized by the clients. They went on to say that traditional counseling can even "be harmful" to minority populations (p. 195). Utilizing Foucault's (2009) historical analysis of the psychological gaze, one can see that therapists have inherited hundreds of years of moralism, oppression, and power dynamics as soon as they assume the role of the professional who can treat mental illnesses.

It might be that there is a general belief that all therapists are nonprejudiced, but more likely it is a result of the reluctance to integrate the shadow aspects into a theory of healing. If this notion is accepted, that clinicians are simultaneously transmitting prejudice as well as praise, the question then becomes what the ratio is of poison to antidote in our therapy sessions. This would mean that the transmission of prejudice is unavoidable, but also much more harmful in long-term therapy with a psychotherapist

who has unexplored prejudices that involves their client's cultural or ethnic background. The titration of poison over the course of many years of therapy into the unconscious of the client could potentially negate any benefit the client might receive while prolonging the length of treatment. Jungian analyst Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig (1971/2009) explored this briefly when he discussed the unconscious "charlatan" (pp. 30-32) that psychotherapists have that is invested in prolonging the client's illness. If this is true, then therapists who become invested in healing as the goal to therapy have an ulterior motive to prolonging the illness. The unconscious relationship between the transmission of self-hate prejudice to the client could then become a Munchausen by proxy relationship where the therapist is benefiting from the slow poisoning of the client to prolong the relationship and gain personal and professional self-esteem by maintaining long-term treatment.

Current Models of Diversity Training and What Is Missing

It is difficult to survey the entire subject of cultural competency, as it spans multiple academic disciplines and professional fields. One can become easily overwhelmed by the amount of information available as well as the various approaches put forth. I noticed in my own education and experiences as a trainee that cultural competency was compartmentalized as a portion of clinical competency. Boxes were checked to make sure we were considering certain aspects of the client's identity and then we were expected to move into the standard treatment planning. As a student of anthropology, I saw the problems that arose when my peers were presented with formulaic methods to clients with different backgrounds than their own. Many of my peers had never been exposed to theories of systemic oppression, hegemony, and institutionalized racism. When presented with formulaic approaches such as Hays' (2008)

ADDRESSING model or McGoldrick et al.'s (2005) overly stereotypic and borderline racist models to approaching family therapy, they had no reservations and dove right in. In my attempts to address the limitations in these approaches, I was met with a lot of the resistance that Sue and Sue (2016) mentioned as roadblocks to competency and found that some of my peers tended to embrace flawed methodology rather than to dive into the depths of their own critical awareness.

There are inherent pitfalls in training people who do not have backgrounds in critical theory or experience studying culture. Frameworks such as Hays' (2008) model lead to the potential for counselors to overestimate their cultural competency based on their mastery of an acronym. Hays (2008) spent several chapters reviewing the importance of self-evaluation, understanding one's internal biases, and reflecting on the client's cultural world; however, it is the ADDRESSING model that most practitioners leave with. Understandably, it is easier and less time intensive to apply an acronym than to self-evaluate when reviewing a session, developing interventions, and taking notes, but one has to wonder if this is in service to the therapist's ego or to the client. Looking at Hillman's (1977) critique of literalization, we see that it is a crutch that we do not need and only limits mobility.

Although Sue and Sue (2016) advocated for minority groups to understand their own biases towards other oppressed groups, they do little to encourage nondominant group members to investigate the biases they have against themselves (pp. 85-108). Fanon's (1961/2011) work is crucial in this type of reflection because it shows that dominant ideologies infect all groups, not just the ones that benefit from it. What lacks when exploring one's countertransference or individual prejudice beliefs by oneself

through exercises in a book is that it does not engage the social functioning of prejudice, leaving therapists at a disadvantage.

Depth Psychology Limitations

As this research is intended to aid and further the discussion of diversity amongst depth-oriented clinicians, specifically Jungians and post-Jungians, more detail on the limitations of archetypally influenced psychology is given. This section is dedicated to exploring and exposing Jungian and post-Jungian shadow material that is often neglected (Young-Eisendrath, 2010), even though it is the field that not only developed that form of inquiry, but lauds it (Jung, 1904/2014). Much of what is discussed in this section is encapsulated in the following quote:

Jung's attitudes to women, blacks, so-called "primitive" cultures, and so forth are now outmoded and unacceptable. It is not sufficient to assert that he intended them to be taken metaphorically—not least because this may not have been how he intended his writing to be taken! We can now see how Jung converted prejudice into theory, and translated his perception of what was current into something supposed to be eternally valid. (Samuels, 2008, p. 2)

Samuels is referring to Jung's (1904/2014) original writings on the shadow in which he referred to the shadow as "dark" and as becoming apparent when one acts "uncontrolled" like a "primitive . . . incapable of moral judgment (p. 9). Brewster (2017) also addressed this issue when she noted that very often in Jungian psychology the image of African Americans is seen as the presence of the shadow.

Samuels (2008) went on to explain that the value is not in attacking Jung or discrediting his theories completely, but rather that through the application of a "critical" (p. 3) lens, the true value and applicability of his concepts to modern issues can become apparent. Samuels' critique is in line with the intention of this thesis, which is to expose

the shadow of prejudice and bias in Jungian and post-Jungian concepts in order to uncover the true value.

One limitation to the application of cultural competency in Jungian archetypal methodology is the prevalence of white middle- to upper-class practitioners and the use of symbols and myths from other cultures. I was very excited to read Adams' (1996) *Multicultural Imagination: "Race," Color and the Unconscious*, but the following passage in the preface set the stage for most of his approach in the book: "What interests me is not whether Jung, Freud, or any other analysts in the past were racists, but whether analysts and therapists in the present and future are and will be effective multiculturalists" (p. xxi). This statement ignores most of the postmodern and poststructural precedent set by theorists such as Foucault (1963/1994, 1995). The poststructuralists have argued that one cannot enact change, or even begin to understand a paradigm, without a historical inquiry into the foundations of it.

A few years later, Adams (2003) expanded upon some areas of his early work that I had noticed lacked any sort of critical perspective towards Jung but did not change course completely. He listed suggestions such as:

Jungian analysts reconsider the practice of immediately interpreting on the "subjective level" blacks who appear in dreams (especially in the dreams of whites) simply as the "shadow" that is, merely as derivative personifications of "dark," ostensibly negative or inferior aspects of the dreamer. (Adams, 2003, para. 16)

He also stated, "Jungian analysts reconsider the tendency to regard blackness, or nigredo, in alchemy as merely an initial stage that should be superseded by a subsequent stage of whiteness, or albedo" (Adams, 2003). What is alarming in this particular revision is the informal statement of "Jungian analysts reconsider." Adams is avoiding a direct call to

action where the core use of these concepts is brought into question. Considering that the shadow is traditionally viewed as negative material (Jung, 1904/2014), it is alarming that the equation of shadow and blackness has not been viewed more critically. The same concern arises when considering the implications of nigredo being viewed as a lesser stage than albedo when Jungians use alchemical symbols and imagery when working with clients. Young-Eisendrath (1987) also commented on this:

How is this relevant to what I see as our collective Jungian racism? In two ways, I believe. First, when we consider the Afro-American person to represent archetypal blackness, an undifferentiated state of confusion or potentiality, we may then assume that such a person is, in fact, carrying aspects of ourselves. In other words, when we interpret the image of a black person, or actual experiences with black people, to represent the negative side of the split within our own subjectivity, then we are acting with an unconscious (or conscious) hatred. (p. 43)

The problem in using Jung's original concepts is that when they are taken and used on a literal level, they begin to embody the prejudices that Jung's ego possessed. Although Hillman (1977) warned of the stagnation present in a literal interpretation, he did not address the racism and bias that was the foundation for that rigidity he was lambasting. Samuels (1993) elaborated on this, stating, "when people adopt Jung's approach to 'opposites,' they should recall where that way of thinking can lead" (p. ix). There may be many benefits to utilizing dichotomous thinking, but it needs to be approached with caution, which is not generally the case when using Jung's theories.

Appropriation and essentialism. Psychoanalytic traditions have emphasized a universal layering to the mind. Sigmund Freud (1923/1961) promoted the id, ego, and superego as psychic structures whereas Jung (1954/1968) posited that the collective unconscious, personal unconscious, and conscious mind are populated with various satellite figures. Jung believed that archetypes, deep internal structures, lived in the

collective unconscious and were projected into the personal unconscious and understood through the ego. Jung's association to Platonic ideals went further than his explanation that label of archetypes was just a "paraphrase" to Plato's concepts (Jung, 1954/1968, p. 16).

For therapists who follow the Jungian tradition, archetypes are an ever-present phenomenon. The question posed here is whether beliefs in Jungian archetypes are associated with essentialist thinking. Samuels (2004) addressed this when he discussed the "conservative Jungian" (p. xii). Jungian analysts, he explained, have not incorporated modern social theories into their interpretation of Jung and therefore are left with static interpretations that are over a century old and outdated. If we look at the research into psychological essentialism, we can start to draw parallels to how this type of thinking can prevent therapists from being completely aware of their biases. The historical placement and contextual nature of cultural symbols is primary when attempting to locate meaning. Reliance of Jungian psychologists on popular mythologist Joseph Campbell's work is problematic in many ways. Campbell's theories rely on the premise of universal connotations in myths. His most famous example is the monomyth, or hero's journey, detailed in *The Hero With a Thousand Faces* (2008). In a recent article (Jorgensen, 2017), folklorists explained why the academic fields that study myths and folklore have issues with Campbell's work and his impact on popular perceptions of myths. The article reiterates the importance of context in mythology and claims that Campbell has decontextualized the myths he explored by removing any indigenous identity. The authors claim that Campbell's work enables others to develop ethnocentric bias when examining myths due to the practice of "universalizing and essentializing" myths. Part of

Campbell's problem, and that of many Jungians, is that they rely on Jung's model of universally shared archetypes. Jensen (2004) noted that even Jung alluded to the fact that archetypes are not explicitly universal and warned against the use of another culture's archetypes "as a new suit of clothes" (p. 7). When a cultural symbol is removed from its context and utilized by another group, it can land into the realm of cultural appropriation.

Layering of a cultural unconscious into the collective unconscious, which Adams (1996) attempted, is a way of preserving the limited structural model of the human psyche. Many are unwilling to look at the shadow side to their theoretical orientations and how these biases are limiting their perspectives. Jung's theory of the mind has been shown to be based on racist assumptions and Social Darwinism. These concerns were raised in 1988 by Dalal as he addressed the concept of the collective unconscious, stating:

The European brain being "more evolved" has access to the history of the "primitive" by plumbing its own depths, but the brain of the "primitive" being less developed has no such access. The European brain contains the non-European brain. The collective unconscious is not a democratic concept, it is a uni-directional concept. (p. 271)

For Jungians who adhere to the classical definition of individuation, their concept of what individuation is could be diametrically opposed to the cultural values of their clients. Research has shown that most therapists value individual self-exploration, the development of self-reliance, and interpersonal boundaries as primary goals in treatment, which are not congruent with many minority population values (Consoli et al., 2008, pp. 191-193). The concept of individuation established by Jung (1916/1966) and developed further by Hillman (1977) stresses the importance of individuals' reconciliation with their inner world. The belief is that personal growth or becoming individuated is done through engagement with the unconscious and through exploring

archetypal images. The classical definition of individuation ignores the psychological importance of the social realm within minority groups. If therapists are focused on exploring their clients' inner world and looking within, they are not acting culturally competently if their own views clash with the clients'. While not directly referring to Jung's concept of individuation, Foucault (2009) addressed the field's preoccupation with finding an inner self.

There is no point in wanting to dismantle hierarchies, constraints, and prohibitions so that the individual can appear, as if the individual was something existing beneath all relationships of power, pre-existing relationships of power, and unduly weighed down by them. In fact, the individual is the result of something that is prior to it: this mechanism, which pin political power on the body. It is because the body has been "subjectified," that is to say, that the subject-function has been fixed on it, because it has been psychologised and normalized, it is because of all this that something like the individual appeared, about which one can speak, hold discourse, and attempt to found sciences. (p. 56)

Foucault's critique aptly applies to Jungian individuation because he is addressing the presumption that the individual is a priori. Jungians take this concept for granted as they assume that the ultimate goal of psychotherapy is to individuate one's inner self away from the various complexes that steer it from its natural destiny. According to Foucault, these forces are responsible for the emergence of the individual so that it may be studied and controlled. It is a scary but interesting proposition that Foucault posited and one questions whether Jungians are attempting to add to the body politic by forcing the individual to appear so it can be studied.

In the shadow of Jung. Perhaps the largest obstacle to establishing cultural-competency legitimacy in depth psychology is the criticism aimed directly at Jung. Jung was widely condemned for having anti-Semitic attitudes at a time when Jewish people were being persecuted (Maidenbaum & Martin, 1991). He was also accused of being a

cult leader and self-obsessed, delusional megalomaniac (Noll, 1994, 1997). The main criticisms aimed at Jung regard his timing on discussing the differences between Jewish and Germanic psychologies. The most often cited sentence, which is damning in light of Hitler's characterizations of Jews being parasitic is:

The Jew, who is something of a nomad, has never yet created a cultural form of his own and as far as we can see never will, since all his instincts and talents require a more or less civilized nation to act as host for their development. (Jung, 1934/1970, p. 135)

When Jung had written these statements, Hitler was already chancellor in Germany and Hitler's anti-Semitic views were known.

Jung's relationship to Nazi Germany was also questioned when he was placed as the editor of the *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie*, which was being run by Matthias Göring, the cousin of Herman Göring, Hitler's second-in-command. Many leading scientists and psychologists questioned his integrity in accepting that position given the upheaval in Germany ("Psychologists Believe Jung Under Nazi Thumb," 1936). Samuels (1991) dispelled the excuses that Jung was a product of his time, or that he was unaware of the plight of the Jews at the time of his writings (pp. 180-181). Despite my own education at a Jungian-based institution I had never come across the accusations of Jung being anti-Semitic. When I began to ask my peers or bring the issue up among them it was a common retort that he was a product of his time, despite them not actually reading his more prejudiced passages. Samuels (1993) furthered this point by stating Jung had other opinions to reference at the time and was in no direct threat by the Nazis in order to feel pressured to speak about Jewish people, and that his remarks in *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie* continued to be published after Jung claimed ignorance of Nazi propaganda being inserted without his knowledge (pp. 291-293).

Africans and Americans

Jung continued to exhibit racism and bias in his writings about African Americans. In “The Complications of American Psychology” (1930/1970), Jung discussed the effects of “the American negro” on white psychology (p. 46). While at a party in New Hampshire where he lamented the conservative nature of the white hosts not embodying the American nature he came to see, he began telling stories to try and elicit the “real American laughter, that grand, unrestrained, unsophisticated laughter revealing rows of teeth, tongue, palate, everything, just a trifle exaggerated perhaps and certainly less than sixteen years old. How I loved that African brother” (p. 390). Brewster (2017), Samuels (2004, 2015, 2016), and Adams (1991) have also addressed Jung’s biased past and his racist comments towards Africans and African Americans.

It is no secret that Jung harbored the mindset of many of his contemporaries, which also presents itself in his theories; however, what is surprising is the continued use of citations in Jung’s collected works without addressing the blatantly racist passages that scholars have to read through to get to them. The one footnote added is to defend Jung’s use of a racial slur, in regards to which the editor noted: “the offensive term was not invariably derogatory in earlier British and Continental usage, and definitely not in this case” (Jung, 1935/1976, p. 826). I would argue that Jung did mean to use that word in a derogatory way. He is using that word to refer to himself as a primitive who is closer to primitive mind states as well as the word being used as a tool for oppression and racial violence at the time. It seems that the editor who wrote that footnote is unwilling or unable to see Jung’s shadow, despite how brightly it may be projected. This oversight is

exactly what Dalal (1988) was referring to when he described “the selective blindness of the Jungians” (p. 263). Jungian scholars’ consistent disregard for Jung’s racist writings place the field at a disadvantage and may lead many to avoid the field altogether.

Listed below are some comments Jung (1930/1970) wrote in *The Complications of American Psychology* that are rarely brought up when Jungians are discussing his character. He stated that African Americans “tend toward sexual primitivity” (p. 392). When discussing the state of white Americans’ psyche, he noted, “What is more contagious than to live side by side with a rather primitive people? Go to Africa and see what happens. When it is so obvious that you stumble over it, you call it ‘going black’” (p. 393). Jung very often stated that darker skinned people acted as signifiers to deeper layers of the white psyche: “The inferior man has a tremendous pull because he fascinates the inferior layers of our psyche. . . . He reminds us—or not so much our conscious as our unconscious mind” (p. 392).

Seemingly to Jung (1930/1970), the tone of one’s skin is related to psychic age. When he discussed brown-skinned people, he stated they are not as at risk of being influenced as whites: “The Latin peoples being older don’t need to be so much on their guard, hence their approach to the coloured man is different” (1930/1970, p. 392). Where I find it most difficult to reconcile Jungian psychology from Jung is when he discussed what he viewed as psychological exchanges between blacks and whites in the United States (Jung, 1930/1970). Jung was a well-educated adult when he made these comments, which shows a general neglect for the violent history that blacks had recently undergone in the United States. Throughout her book, Brewster (2017) touched on Jung’s contradictory ignorance. She asked, “whether it is possible that he knew so little about the

true nature of the psychological and physical suffering of most African Americans?” (p. 17). Despite Jung’s desire to portray himself as a psychological pioneer, he voiced the conservative and backward racist ideology of the time. His version of transference, which if analyzed between two white participants would encompass ancient archetypes and imaginal figures, is reduced to self-hate when viewed between black and white populations. He stated, “As a rule the coloured man would give anything to change his skin, and the white man hates to admit that he has been touched by the black” (1930/1970, p. 393). Jung (1930/1970) made an unconscious comparison of American jazz to African Americans, presumably to his preference of white European classical music, stating:

American music is most obviously pervaded by the African rhythm and the African melody. . . , It would be difficult not to see that the coloured man, with his primitive motility, his expressive emotionality, his childlike directness, his mobility, his sense of music and rhythm, his funny and picturesque language, has infected the American “behaviour.” (p. 395)

Although it may be accurate to infer the influence of African modalities and rhythm in American jazz, Jung’s choice of wording and the characteristics he chose to emphasize are clearly racist and belittling. It is surprising that this next passage is not quoted more frequently when authors mention Jung’s biased past, as I was very surprised and disturbed when I found it. Jung (1930/1970) openly spoke about the dangers of an integrated and diverse society where whites need to be concerned about preserving their pristine psyche, stating:

Racial infection is a most serious mental and moral problem where the primitive outnumbers the white man. American has this problem only in a relative degree, because the whites far outnumber the coloured. Apparently he can assimilate the primitive influence with little risk to himself. What would happen if there were a considerable increase in the coloured population is another matter. (p. 394)

I believe that all therapists utilizing Jung's theories should be informed of his writings on African Americans. In my experience, Jung's life and writings tend to be romanticized when his merits are explored in detail, but his shortcomings are never discussed. When reading some of the passages listed above, one does not have to infer or elaborate on the concepts being explored to determine whether Jung was a racist. As researchers and therapists who want to use Jungian concepts in session, we must be more diligent in exploring and addressing these issues.

Current Clinical Conditions

When looking at the current state of critical awareness and cultural competency being promoted by depth psychologists, there are some areas where current practitioners can benefit and establish foundations to improve upon. Depth psychologists already possess the training to avoid pathologizing symptoms (Hillman, 1977; Jung, 1904/2014), but what is lacking is the training to apply these skills to address diversity. Typically, depth psychologists are advised to avoid pathologizing psychological symptoms as shown in Hillman's (1977) writings, but this methodology is not directly discussed when thinking about sociocultural dynamics. Jung's psychological types were developed to determine reflexive bias (Jung, 1961/1989, p. 207), but his methodology was mechanistic and needs to be altered. The biases that Jung was looking for are not as nuanced as the ones current practitioners need to be aware of.

Depth psychologists also have the ability to incorporate unconscious processes, dreams, and fantasy as opposed to completely conscious processes based around cognitive behavioral interventions and linguistic cues. Clinical psychologist Jon Mills (2012) addressed modern psychology's reliance on language in his critique of relational

psychology and postmodernism when he noted that the mind does not exclusively use language in meaning making. Depth psychologists have a full set of theories, methodologies, and interventions that allow clients to communicate and engage in therapy without the use of language. Psychologists Morgan Slusher and Craig Anderson's (1987) research showed that individuals will create imaginal figures or scenarios to reinforce stereotypes and prejudice when their reality testing fails to meet their internalized bias. Active imagination, dream work, and sandplay/sandtray are already ways that depth practitioners can approach these subjects. Hillman (1977) very notably argued for the power of images and some studies (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001) have shown that engaging the imagination is a way to combat prejudiced figures that inhabit the unconscious.

Interestingly, the exploration of transference and countertransference is perfectly developed to deal with counselors' implicit bias toward nondominant group members, but is typically not used for this. As imaginal psychologist David Tacey (1998) wrote on the potential of Hillman's *anima mundi*:

The fantasy of "my" specialness, "my" interiority, is lost, and one reawakens to the awesome mystery and "otherness" of the outside world. But it is no longer an "otherness" that excludes "me" or that makes me feel alien; on the contrary, it is a mystery that is co-extensive with my own deepest being, and in the face of the world I find the reflection and likeness of "my" own soul. (p. 218)

This can be applied to cultural competency in the ability of therapists to see themselves in their clients even though the physical or cultural differences may seem overpowering. The point here is to be thinking metaphorically and imaginally, not literally. This is not a way to erase diversity into sameness, but to decentralize the therapist's ego so that the client's identity can be brought into the room. A literal

interpretation might lead to countertransference in which the diversity in the room is destroyed and replaced by the therapist's desire for sameness. It could settle some anxiety if therapists were not so concerned with being incompatible with their clients, but embraced the otherness, so that it became a way of them seeing more of the world and of themselves. Sue and Sue (2016) stressed "cognitive empathy" (p. 69) as a crucial component to cultural competency. It may be that the techniques that imaginal psychology embraces through active imagination, projection, and deliteralization can help develop the type of empathy to which Sue and Sue referred.

Concepts of the shadow enable therapists to look at what social forces are being projected onto clients in relation to what the culture is valuing in its persona. "These repressed aspects of our selves mesh with the character of groups that our culture marginalizes. We then project the evil side of our culture onto these groups, seeing them as more different, more threatening, than they really are" (Jensen, 2004, p. 16). Investigating what types of shadow representation emerge in dreams or in the imaginal space can uncover latent prejudices in clients and therapists of which they are unaware. This is a common practice that is already practiced by many Jungians, but not in relation to prejudice or stereotypes nor in relation to developing cultural competency.

Samuels (2016) discussed the use of synchronic and diachronic methodology in session with a client (p. 13). This can involve placing a hold on the importance of knowing if past behavior or archetypal patterns or images are being evoked and listening to clients as they are presently experiencing subjects. As applied to working with cultural competency, the pluralistic approach to time would be to look at the immediate effect of what the clients are experiencing and how they are experiencing it. In the face of

structural oppression, a therapist would be mindful of the historical implications impacting their client, but not invested in immediately exploring or discussing the history. A truly pluralistic approach would also work in the inverse where a therapist would be open to exploring the historical implications impacting the client while placing a hold on the immediate issues. Being able to switch between personal, cultural, and historical issues with the client can provide a more fluid and realistic exploration of how these issues may be affecting them.

Chapter IV

Summary and Conclusions

When I began this thesis, I did not expect to find many depth-oriented psychologists writing on this topic. I was familiar with some of Samuels' work, but had not heard of Brewster, Morgan, or Dalal. While many of these authors' works are similar to what this thesis explores, a lot of their material lacks the academic rigor to contend with modern critical work on cultural competency. The methodologies explored by these analysts are spread out between many different volumes and do not include references to their past work, or updated and amended writings they have produced since their original publications. It was disheartening to come across criticism such as Dalal's (1988) and Young-Eisendrath's (1987), which were written over thirty years ago and are just as prevalent and valid to this day. Authors such as Andrew Samuels seem to be relegated to niche markets and have not been able to permeate the larger Jungian discourse as Hillman was able to.

Authors such as Dalal (1988), Brewster (2017), and Samuels (2004, 2006) have shown that if Jungians practiced psychotherapy the way that Jung would have, they would be operating from a place of racism and close-mindedness. Depth psychologists would view our African American clients as primitive, our Native American clients as violent, and our Latino clients as inhabiting a psyche that may or not be able to individuate. As many defendants of Jung retort, Jung was a product of his time, and unfortunately his time was full of sexists, bigots, and racists. Jung's theories and personal

beliefs are laden with archaic views on native people and imbued with racist and bigoted ideology. Any modern practitioner cannot conscientiously use his theories without making large amendments to core principles. Clinically, this work shows that the field of depth psychology is far behind modern cultural competency standards and very often may be inhibiting any sort of progress in therapy. There are depth psychologists that are attempting to advance the field and leave behind its prejudiced past, but there is not a coherent community advocating for this. The Jungian field remains predominantly white and in service to white individuals. Young-Eisendrath (1987) wrote about this over thirty years ago, stating: “If we have no black American Jungians with whom to be in dialogue, how can we differentiate our theory and individuate ourselves as American practitioners and theorists?” (p. 51). Depth psychology has many beneficial aspects that can be used to weaken prejudice and help build cultural competency, but the concepts need to be reworked by the community at large.

For those of us who would like to carry depth psychology into the 21st century, we are luckily not Jung, and have the potential for awareness and radical change within the field. I remain hopeful that practitioners will continue to revise and adapt many of depth psychology’s theories to be more in line with modern critical modalities. Structural change is always harder to implement than individual change, but given that most depth psychological researchers are also practitioners, it provides us the advantage to make a generational change so that future depth psychologists can inherit a more inclusive field.

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